Kal Raustiala 0:04

Good afternoon, everyone. I'm Kal Raustiala, Director of the UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations, and it's my pleasure to welcome you to this webinar, co-sponsored by The Nazarian Center for Israel Studies at UCLA, the UCLA Center for Middle East Development, the International and Comparative Law Program and The Promise Institute for Human Rights. And as our two panelists, I'm going to urge our panelists to come on, put their cameras on and their microphones on, two familiar faces, if you're a regular at our events, Dalia Dassa Kaye, of course, our Senior Fellow at the Burkle Center, Dov Waxman, the Gilbert Foundation Chair in Israel Studies and Professor of Political Science, both here at UCLA, both really fantastic experts and speakers about sort of all things Middle East, but especially this particular conflict. So, I'm very happy to have both of them on. We'll run for about one hour. We will have a conversation amongst the three of us, and then we'll have some time at the end for questions. You can put your questions in through the Q & A feature. We'll be sending around a reminder about that as we kind of get into the second half of the hour. So, please do raise questions and we'll go to those as as appropriate. So, so with that preface, we're here to talk about the Gaza ceasefire and assess its significance. I thought the first thing that we could do was just begin with why this ceasefire has happened now.

This has been obviously a topic of discussion for a very long time, and by some reports, the basic outlines, and we'll get into the outlines of what this ceasefire really entails, have also been on the table in some way or another for quite a while. So, so why now? So, maybe Dov, do you want to start with that?

Dov Waxman 2:01

Sure. Yeah, well, first of all, thank you for hosting this event. I'm always happy to have an opportunity to talk of you and with Dahlia, and especially on this occasion. So we have something slightly more positive to talk about.

So, in terms of the why now? As you said, I think it's an important question, because the deal that has been reached is really, as you noted, one that's been on the table for at least eight months. It's not really any different from the one that then President Biden presented in May last year, and that was a deal that was a proposal, which was supposedly presented to him by Prime Minister Netanyahu. So, it does beg the question of you know, if this deal has been on the table for so long, why did it take eight months to achieve? And I think we should also bear in mind that that eight month delay, if you like, was extremely costly. Right. Hostages were murdered and killed during this time. Thousands of Palestinians were killed during this time period, and much of Gaza was devastated. So, this was a very, very costly delay. And there are lots of reasons for why the deal wasn't reached before then. I personally think a lot of it has to do with Prime Minister Netanyahu.

And so I think that is the the explanation, really, for why now has a lot to do with Netanyahu. If you think Hamas was the obstacle, then maybe you might put more emphasis upon Hamas' calculations. But I think Netanyahu was the key player here. So two factors that I would identify, first of all, the external factor, namely the Trump factor. Of course, the President made it very clear before he came into office that he wanted this war to end. He wanted hostages to be released before his inauguration. And his envoy, Steve Witkoff, apparently put on some pressure on Netanyahu to reach this agreement. And I think Netanyahu wants to please Trump, and really, you know, had basically decided, you know, shortly after the presidential election, that he was going to wait for this agreement to give it as a kind of gift, if you like, to Trump. So I think Trump, the Trump, fact is, is a major the other factor is the internal shift in Israel. And this is no less important, I think. And that is the expansion of Netanyahu's governing coalition by which was which was brought about primarily through incorporating a small party led by a former liquid Nick and a former Netanyahu ally, Gideon Sa'ar, who's now the Foreign Minister, his entry into Netanyahu's coalition, his party's entry, gave it the kind of safety net, if you like, so that the coalition wouldn't, couldn't be toppled by one, just one of the far right parties that have basically had been saying all along that they would leave the coalition bring down the government if Netanyahu agreed to a hostage deal once Gideon Sa'ar's party had entered, Netanyahu was somewhat less vulnerable to that far right pressure. And I think that allowed him to feel that he could, his government could survive basically, and he could remain in power by agreeing to this. So I think those, those are the two most important factors that I would identify.

Kal Raustiala 5:41

Terrific. Thank you. Dalia, do you want to add to that?

Dalia Dassa Kaye 5:45

Yeah, yeah. I, you know, I agree with with most, if not all, of that analysis. I would just take it back. First of all, thanks for having us. Kal, this is great to have these kinds of discussions.

I just want to say, taking it to the bigger picture, the fundamental, I think, issue, and I just want to underscore Dov's point of how tragic it is that it took this long. What is really absolutely devastating to think about, especially for all of those who lost loved ones, the destruction, the death that has unfolded over the past, not just last eight months, but really since the last ceasefire in November of 2023 when you have the first release of hostages, the first humanitarian relief, the first pause of fighting. It has been a long time coming, and we can't roll back the clock and get those lives and destruction back. So it is an absolute tragedy that said, obviously, any end to this horrific war is good news. So I'm in the camp and agree this is positive. Cautiously, you know, we have to be cautiously optimistic about it. Now, I would only say the big reason I think we were at such a deadlock for so long, in addition to Netanyahu and his political survival concerns, which I think were, that's right, absolutely fundamental was that the basic purpose or goal for each of the sides were fundamentally at odds. Hamas' goal was to survive, to regroup and live to fight another day, and Israelis, Israel's goal was to destroy and eliminate Hamas. And Hamas was not going to agree to a ceasefire until it knew it had some guarantees it could survive. And Israel wasn't going to give up until it felt it had significantly devastated and degraded the group enough that it could prevent another October 7. And what's really astonishing is here we are finally at what looks like, hopefully, a more enduring ceasefire than what we saw last November, 2023 and yet it's not clear that either side has fundamentally won. Nobody's won in this war, lots of losers, but no winners. So I would just add that that perspective. And on the Trump effect, I think it's absolutely there, but we should keep in mind, I think sometimes it's been couched as a pressure, but it's, it's not clear if it was pressure or incentive. Because, you know, ultimately, what was Trump going to do to Netanyahu? Is he going to, you know, cut off arms sales to Israel? I think that's highly unlikely, even moving forward, if Israel doesn't abide by this. I think it was more Netanyahu understanding, he wanted to be in the good graces. It was a favor, and what he got in return is still not clear. We could go into that a little bit in terms of what's happening in the West Bank now. So, just to you know, start giving, just flagging some of the reasons why I'm worried that this agreement may not be sustainable is because some of that fragile underpinning of why this conflict went on so long is going to create challenges for the agreement going forward. So, I'm happy to lay out in phases where I see sticking points, but I think that's very important to keep in mind that there will be major sticking points ahead.

Kal Raustiala 9:02

Great, great. Yeah, I do want to get to that and obviously sketch out a little bit of what is the actual content and what can we expect. But just on the role of Trump, I guess, yeah, I'm curious if both of you want to just add a little bit to, you know, Dahlia, you sort of got at this of, is it that simply wanting to be in his good graces, he's made clear many times that he wants this war to end, or wanted this war to end without really specifying what that is. I think everyone knows his psychology and the need to kind of curry favor with him is very important, but it sounds like there wasn't much beyond that, except maybe this conversation that Witkoff had with Netanyahu, which I guess we don't really know exactly what was said. But you know, were there threats? It sounds like Dalia, you think there were no threats. There were just maybe inducements or something. Do we know anymore about, really, what, what kind of conversation unfolded there, and whether there was any content, I guess, to to Trump's demands or requests or or even just his position?

Dov Waxman 10:00

So, so my, you know, yeah, I certainly don't think you know, he's gonna, he would have threatened to curtail US aid to Israel, as some on the left have, have long been calling for. But I, you know, and it's quite possible, as Dalia said, that that, you know, some kind of sweetness, some deal inducement was was offered, or some agreement that we don't know of, but I wouldn't underestimate the kind of bully pulpit, because I think one of the, you know, one of the key things that I think I was critical of President Biden and his administration when it came to their management of the of these talks was really that they did not that Secretary of State, Blinken, in particular, never came out and said what everybody was saying behind closed doors, which is that Netanyahu has been an obstacle, and that Netanyahu has been sabotaging the talks. So, this gave Netanyahu the domestic space to say, because the Israeli public wanted these hostages, so you know that Hamas were the obstacle, and to blame Hamas. And I think it's possible, you know that that Trump could have come out and said, right, not, not by playing, applying any leverage in terms of threats to kind of curtail arms, but simply saying, Netanyahu has is an obstacle here, and I think that would have put him, Netanyahu, under a lot of pressure domestically. Biden really wasn't willing to do that for whatever reason. So, I think, you know, there's no doubt some mix, but I think more broadly, there's a belief that Netanyahu has and others that you know Trump's going to deliver in other ways. Maybe allow an Israeli strike against Iran. Maybe, you know, allow annexation of the West Bank they have a whole wish list. I think it's unrealistic and probably won't happen, but they might. I think the belief that, well, if we give him something on this, not very much, because I don't think they are going to agree to end the war, but let's at least give him the, you know, the first stage of this ceasefire, and some hostages, and that will be enough to kind of appease him and then get his agreement for our wish list on these other issues.

Kal Raustiala 12:17

Yeah, is there any parallel, just, sorry, Dalia, just on this last point about the Presidents and new Presidents. You know, of course, in 1980 the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis, Ronald Reagan coming in. That is a broad parallel, rough parallel. Are there any lessons we can learn from that about new administrations coming in, into difficult situations like this, and kind of resetting, I guess, the negotiations?

Dalia Dassa Kaye 12:41

Well, that was an extremely controversial example, and so that's the general understanding, is that there, you know, the Carter administration did negotiate the deal and purposefully the Iranians as well, but there's questions about how much the Reagan administration was involved in that decision to make sure to wait until just hours after Reagan's inauguration so that they could get the credit. So, there is a precedent for this, and that is not too far fetched to believe that was part of the scenario. We know Netanyahu very much was a backer of Trump. Actively was working against the Biden administration, the Obama administration, before that. Put inserted himself in US domestic politics to an extent we have never seen. And so, that wouldn't be a surprise. Now, I don't think we should be too, you know, I don't think we don't know is the bottom line what went on behind the scenes, but what we can do is look at evidence of what's now unfolding. So, for example, in this first week after the ceasefire, we have a major Israeli assault in the West Bank. We know that Trump administration appointees to the United Nation, his ambassador to Israel, believes the West Bank is part of biblical Israel, is supportive of settlement expansion. So, these are not our, you know, our guesses as to what's going on. These are concrete facts of how this administration would likely approach the broader Israeli Palestinian conflict. Whether there was a quid pro quo, you get me, just give me the optics. And, you know, look with with President Trump in his first round again, let's go with concrete things. You know, he promised lots of things. Peace with North Korea. Let's do a big summit. Let's do a coin to memorize, you know, to commemorate the event and what happened? There's no, as far as I know, there's no peace on the Korean peninsula, and the Korean missile threat is as serious as it's ever been. So, you could do lots of talk about peace. You can do lots of optics. The question is whether there's going to be follow through, and what will be the general approach. And this gets to my first kind of flagging of areas of concern about why this deal may never go past the first stage. And we should just say, and I think Dov make sure we outlined that, this is a three phased deal, right? This is not an immediate end to the war. So, I agree, we want to be positive and hope there's an end. This is the beginning of the end, but it's a three stage process. The first stage is 42 days, which is six weeks. Six weeks is a long time in the Middle East. This is a period when there's supposed to be an increase of humanitarian assistance, about 600 truckloads a day, which seems to be happening, which is good news. It's supposed to be the release of 33 Israeli hostages, coming out in a very small batches. And so we had three on Sunday, the first deal day of the ceasefire, supposed to be another four being released Saturday, but a lot of things, and then Palestinian prisoner release, and ultimately, most importantly, a pause in fighting. But the problem is a lot of things can go wrong when you're talking about hostage and prisoner release. There can be controversy about which prisoners, which hostages. It's not just Hamas holding some of these hostages, other Palestinian militant groups, like Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has some of them. You could have a hardliner inside who just decides, no, we're not going to give up this, this valuable asset that they look at as leverage. These families are kind of on edge waiting. Israel is already getting a lot less than what was initially hoped for, if you think back months ago. I mean, out of these 33 the hope is all of them are living, but it's not even clear. I've heard from Israeli sources that there's not even clarity that all 33 will be alive. So, I mean, and this was never a question in back in the November deal, in terms of who would come back. So, there are a lot of things that can go wrong. Hamas could think Israeli, the Israelis, are not withdrawing properly from cities. They're not allowing Palestinians to return to the north. Just today, there are reports of security contractors, American security contractors, being sent to actually monitor safe you know, passage of Palestinians moving back to their homes in the north of Gaza, which had been pretty much just demolished. And you know, what if something goes wrong? They're supposed to look to see if any guns are going in and so forth. You know what, if someone gets killed in one of these checkpoints. I mean, lots of things could go south. I don't want to spoil the hope, but a lot of things can go wrong. And just to add to this, the negotiations for phase two, and phase two is supposed to be the the additional release of all the remaining hostages that are living and prisoner exchange, and a full Israeli, Israeli withdrawal. The negotiations for that start on day 16, of the first phase, which is February 4th. So, already in the first phase, you could have lots of disagreement about, what is the agreement made a very, very vague, what is Israeli withdrawal? Are they going to leave all of the territory that they were occupying during this invasion? And what is an end to war? The second stage, as Dov said he's skeptical there's going to be an end to war, will Netanyahu finally agree to end the war and potentially threaten his political survival? That fundamental question was lingering from day one. It's there today. And then finally, if we ever get to stage three, which is supposed to be the big reconstruction of Gaza, I mean, the challenges there are beyond imaginable. You have estimates of $50 million in destruction, some estimates of hundreds of of it would take hundreds of years to get back to the GDP you had in 2022 in that territory. You have a tremendous governance question of what's going to fill the vacuum there. So, there are so many hurdles. I don't want to be so skeptical, because I think there are motivations for all sides to move forward. Hamas wants to survive, to live another day, unfortunately, and that is a strong motivating factor. In Israel, at least, especially the Israeli public, the IDF, they want the prisoners out. They want time to recuperate. There are reasons I think this deal could have momentum, and even if it's not all settled, as long as negotiations are happening, there's no fighting. And sometimes that may be the best we can hope for, given all of these ambiguities and uncertainties about as doubly doubt what can happen in the Israeli political system, so that, just to flag some of the big issues that are going to be lying ahead.

Kal Raustiala 19:33

Yeah, Dalia, I think those are all excellent points. And you know, I know a little bit about the kind of ancient history of these, these withdrawals and these efforts from the 40s and the 50s and even the Suez Crisis, et cetera. Many problems along the lines that you described came up in the implementation, because, of course, there's always ambiguity, sometimes deliberate ambiguity. That's how you get to agreement. You paper over something and you hope, and that doesn't always work. So, I think you're right to you know, to raise those concerns, and I hope that they don't come to fruition. But I think it would be foolhardy to expect that something will go go wrong. Dov anything to add in terms of kind of the basic structure and what we should...?

Dov Waxman 20:13

Yeah, so, I mean, first of all, you know, I think I would think it would have been better, and I believe many Israelis think felt similarly for there to have been a single, comprehensive deal that would have released all the hostages in exchange for that to the war. I mean, I think the war, you know, should have ended many, many months ago. And so, I think that was the that was the best deal. This is better than no deal for for the reasons that Dalia has laid out. But I think the nature of this deal, as Dalia explained in these three phases, not only means that it's susceptible to spoilers, as we've seen, you know, in previous Israeli Palestinian deals, like the Oslo Accords, you know, there are groups on both sides, individuals and armed groups that have the willingness and the ability to derail this agreement. That's even, that's even assuming that the parties themselves want to go through to it. I mean, in the case of the Oslo, you know, it was the ostensibly they the parties wanted the deals to succeed, but spoilers were able to derail it. In this case, you don't just have spoilers who are going to try and derail it. That includes even elements within Hamas, as well as within the Israeli government, but also, I think in this case, at least one of the parties, I don't want to, you know, make Hamas out to be some sort of reliable actor in this, but I think they have a strong interest in this succeeding, because indeed, that will basically deliver them victory in their terms, i.e. survival. But I think Netanyahu does not have an interest in this deal succeeding, and so I personally think it's very unlikely that this will succeed. I think probably, if there was any kind of agreement between Trump and Netanyahu, it was over the fact of like, let's get through phase one, and then, you know, you'll be allowed to resume the war. You know, we'll have hostages come home. They'll blame Hamas. They'll find a way, and Netanyahu can. So, I think it's very and tragically because that is if the war does resume, and if we don't get to phase two, then that is probably likely to spell the death of the living, remaining, living hostages. So, I think this agreement is maybe wasn't designed to fail. I don't think the the Biden administration, in putting together this framework of these spaces, wanted that. But I think it does allow, it does give Netanyahu the ability to sabotage the talks. He's very good at doing that. He did that during the Oslo process. He did that during the talks up until now. And I think it's ultimately whether we get to phase two. I'm not even talking about phase three, but even, you know, just getting to phase two and ending the war and the release of the hostages, whether we get to that, I think, is going to depend upon the Trump administration and the President and the early indications. And I mean, this is really reading the tea leaves, and you know, the kind of Trump statements, which are always hard to decipher, but the early indications are not encouraging, I would say. In the sense that he said recently,Trump, he's not confident that the agreement is going to succeed. So he's already, kind of, you know, preparing the ground. He's, he said, also, this is their war, not our war. Again, preparing to say, you know, I basically did what I can. This is their problem. Let them figure it out. You know, I think in an ideal world, yeah, maybe he wants the war to end so he can, you know, win a Nobel Peace Prize by brokering a diplomatic agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. But I don't know, at this stage in his presidency, very early on, he's got a lot of other things to do, that he's going to want to spend any political capital having a battle with Netanyahu, or putting the kind of pressure on that would be necessary to convince Netanyahu to abandon, to risk the survival of his government in order to carry out a set the second phase. So, I think, unfortunately, you know, and maybe even more pessimistic than Dalia, I don't think this is likely to, I mean, I still welcome it, because it's better than nothing, and at least some hostages will go home, and there'll be a secession of fighting for, hopefully, you know, for as long as possible. But I think the, you know, I think the view that. This means the war in Gaza is over or imminently about to end? I think is, is probably a little bit too optimistic.

Kal Raustiala 20:13

Right, right? Yeah, no, I think all those questions are very well spoken. You mentioned Saudi so let's pivot a little bit to the regional dimensions of this. Of course, that's one very important player. The Qataris played an important role here as well. So, what are the regional implications? Obviously, that depends a bit on the longevity of this, whether it's successful or not, but even just the sheer fact of it right now, be interesting to hear from both of you really about what you see as the key implications for the region.

Dalia Dassa Kaye 25:23

Well, I can start on that. You know, look, I think this is another bit of good news. And again, I'm not trying to be rosy here. I share a lot of skepticism about whether this and no question phase two is the most critical question, because it's the heart of the issue. Does Netanyahu want to end this war? And and is there a possibility of a new Israeli Government? Which Dov can talk to. But, one point of optimism is an encouraging point, is that all of the Arab states of importance in the region want this war to be over, and they are not the spoilers. They are, in fact, are actively trying to facilitate and encourage the implementation of the ceasefire. So, the Egyptians and Qataris were the most important in terms of the negotiations. They mediated this deal, along with the Biden administration. And over many, many months, you know, they were host of the different delegations, since Israel and Hamas obviously could not negotiate directly, so they were able to be the intermediary. And for different reasons, they have a very strong interest in the succeeding the Egyptians a border with Gaza. They do not want Palestinian refugees from Gaza pressuring, going, trying to go into Egypt. They have a strong interest in Israel withdrawing from quarters like the Philadelphia quarter that got a lot of attention at one point, which is actually part of the 1979 Israeli Egyptian Peace Treaty, which Israel is now in violation of. And so Egypt has a very, very strong interest. They've been active in past Israeli Hamas wars in Gaza and trying to facilitate and get ceasefires.

Kal Raustiala 27:26

Sorry, just to define that corridor, so that's at the very southern edge of the Gaza Strip.

Dalia Dassa Kaye 27:33

Yeah, it's bordering a buffer zone that has you know, lots of controversy over, because Netanyahu made it a very big point that it was absolutely critical to security. Now it seems to be less critical, but there's a lot of ambiguity, frankly, in the phase two of the agreement about whether Israel will be fully withdrawing from those border areas, so called buffer zone areas, including the Rafah border, which is the kind of the passage between Egypt and Gaza to get goods and other things across. So, so these are big, big issues. The Qataris have a different role. They are really interested in their image, growing image of being an important mediator. They have, they'd like to show and kind of, I don't know if you want to say, make up, to some extent, for their long standing support for Hamas that was actually approved by the United States and Israel. For that matter, there was, for many, many years, kind of a sense that, okay, Qatar you can give cash over to Hamas because we just want to keep Gaza quiet, and Netanyahu actually wanted to separate the Palestinian leadership between the West Bank and Gaza, so there was kind of a free pass, and so Hamas really facilitated a lot of Hamas' strength and ability to ultimately launch the kind of attack that it did horribly on October 7. So they kind of have to a lot to make up for. So they want to show that they're actually a good citizen, Global Citizen mediator, and very important in terms of the relationship with Washington. So they have a lot of stake in this agreement succeeding. Those two are probably the most critical. The Saudis and Emiratis are also important. And that is going to be more important in terms of the longer term vision of what happens to Palestinian governance, what happens to rebuilding Gaza? How do you create an alternative because if you don't have an alternative vision, what's going to replace the vacuum that is the rubble of Gaza right now? And there's no good answer to that. All we know is that countries, wealthy countries like the Saudis, Emiratis, they don't want to throw good money after bad. If Hamas is just going to retake over the territory, they are not going to invest in rebuilding, but they have a very strong interest. And I think, you know, to step back. I think it's quite remarkable, and it could be such an opportunity for Israel. You have a moment in history where there is no Arab state, and now, including Syria, right after this dramatic fall of the Assad regime in December 8 that surprised everyone, there is no Arab significant Arab state that is interested in fighting a war with Israel anymore. They are not threatened by Arab states anymore. In fact, Arab states would like Israel to make peace in the region. So you have this amazing opportunity, but yet, if you don't solve the heart of the issue with the Palestinians, all of those opportunities will be very difficult, if not impossible, to fully take advantage of. And at the end of the day, if you don't solve Israelis conflict with the Palestinians, which is the heart of the issue, and if you don't end occupation and have some vision forward, there is no peace. So again, this is, I think the neighborhood is one of the good news stories. They're very supportive for different reasons. Not not because of altruistic they have self interest in the succeeding. But again, Israel will have to make the decision.

Kal Raustiala 28:05

Sorry can you define that. Just such an interesting thing to say, not altruistic, self interested reasons. Just elaborate on what are those?

Dalia Dassa Kaye 30:55

Well it's not, it's not like they're trying to do Israel favors or the Palestinians. I mean, sure, but they have domestic pressures. The Palestinian issue resonates so widely in the Arab world, they get a lot of domestic pressure to deal with this issue. But also they have other priorities at home. They have socio economic problems. They want to diversify their economies away from oil in the case of the Gulf states. And so, you know, they have their own reasons. Wars are not good for business, right? So this is a very strong incentive for the neighborhood to say, 'Enough with this conflict'. And you know, Israel, if you weren't, you know, dealing and with the Palestinians as you are, and you settled this conflict, there's a lot open to you in this region. So the issue is, will Netanyahu make that choice? And here is where I shared that skepticism, because he is not a leader who has shown himself to make those kinds of strategic choices.

Dov Waxman 32:03

Great, great. Yeah. I mean, I completely agree with Dalia that in terms of the national interests, there is an alignment. Israel's national interest, as I see them, you know, or suggest, take this end the war and hope, and then, you know, move toward a diplomatic agreement with Saudi Arabia, which would have a, you know, which would impact Iran in the region, which is Israel's greatest enemy, could bring about Palestinians. There's no question in my mind that an end to the war, leading to a diplomatic process, etc, is in Israel's interest. It's in the interest, as Dalia said, of the Arab states who want this, and it's in the United States' interest who are keen to ensure that the Saudis and others remain kind of connected to the US, and don't grab, you know, move within China's orbit. And so, you know, there's a bigger regional picture here. So in terms of national interest, yes, there is this alignment where I'm you know, skeptical or cynical. You know, I think a long time ago now, back to the 90s, when there was, I believe it was in Israel's national interest then to make peace with the Palestinians, you know. And after the end of the Cold War, is an Arab state's interest. They recognize this at the time, there was the beginning Madrid process, and it was the United States' interest. It wasn't in as he understood it, Benjamin Netanyahu's interest, or the Likud Party's interest. So, you know, unfortunately, we know that it's not just national interests that motivate, it's their political considerations, their domestic politics, and as long as Netanyahu is of the belief that his political interests and his family's interests and his own freedom potentially depend upon an alliance with the far right, which I think they do in the long term. He might be able to get a safety net in the short term from hisopposition parties to conclude an agreement. But he knows, at the end of the day, he doesn't have, you know, his support within the Israeli, among Israelis, has been, you know, declining for some time. And he really, you know, needs his this, these, this alliance with the far right to solidify his hold on now. As long as that's the case, he is susceptible to their pressure. I would also say that, although we often talk about Netanyahu, as this, you know, arch pragmatist, willing to do whatever, and there's always this being, this belief among Americans, including within US administrations, that, you know, if he was presented with the right deal for Israel, he would take it, because he's told them that time and time again. I will, just, but. But if you look at his actions over the course of his very long political career, I think you'll see what is actually, at the heart of it, he has a deep commitment to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. He is deeply committed to preventing that. That is his, you know, ideological inheritance, if you like, and if he, and if this ceasefire agreement goes through in all the stages, and that then leads to a new regime in Gaza, which is necessary for stage three, and the Saudis have already made it very clear that they want some sort of real, tangible path toward Palestinian statehood as the price for normalizing their relations with Israel. Netanyahu is going to be backed into a corner, and he doesn't want that situation, and he doesn't want Trump looking for a Nobel Peace Prize to say, right, here's that, and he managed to get out of it. But, you know, the last trump administration, and even though what Trump presented then was like the deal of the century for Israel, so I just don't think Netanyahu, as long as he's in power, and as long as he is able to, you know, play Israeli politics so masterfully, I think he will find a way to avoid even though. And this is what's so depressing and maddening, even though it is in Israel's interest, and even though, actually, the majority of the Israeli public want all the hostages home and the war to end, or at least are willing to accept the war ending as the price of bringing all the hostages home.

Kal Raustiala 36:34

Yeah, let's, let's talk a little bit more about Trump or about the United States and its interests. So you know, I think you spoke really well, Dov, just now about all the different interests Netanyahu is facing the national interests of various other countries. You know, the American interest in this obviously, every American president for generations has wanted to be the one to somehow untie this knot. And as you say, maybe get the Nobel Peace Prize, sort of like Henry Kissinger or something like that, though he, of course, was not a president, but he might as well have been one for Foreign Affairs. So, that seems like an enduring presidential interest. You know, the national interest is maybe a little harder to say, but what could the United States do realistically, effectively, given our relationships with so many of the players that we've talked about, Saudi the Qataris, we have a huge base, the Israelis, obviously very deep relationship. What's helpful that the United States can do at this point that's realistic that Trump might actually do?

Dov Waxman 37:35

Dalia? Do you want to answer that first?

Dalia Dassa Kaye 37:37

Well I think we need to preface all of this by saying that, you know, Trump is not a president who has clear views on national interest. He's a very personalized leadership style, it is erratic and personalized. So I think reading what he's going to do, is reading what's good for Trump, what's good for his position. And so we need to start from that point. And this is why, earlier, I think both of us were concerned that the optics of, okay, hostages came out, inauguration happened. I'm done. And given, he has pressures and and strongly interested parties among his backers, you know, whether it's donors, whether it's others, whether it's his ambassador to Israel, whether it's others in the Cabinet who are not going to want to press Israel when it let's face it, if you want a real peace deal, then it's between Israelis and Palestinians, which means there has to be real concessions, which means really pressure on Netanyahu. I just don't see that happening. Of course, the US interest has an interest in Israeli-Palestinian peace. What I worry is that we're going to fall back, and this will be very easy to fall into, frankly, the Biden administration did the same thing. They fell into this wishful thinking that you get a Saudi deal, and it's the silver bullet that's going to solve everything, kind of the magic solution to Israeli power. And it is not the magic solution. I think there's a very good chance there'll be Israeli-Saudi normalization with a lot less than a full Palestinian state. Because yes, the prices, the Saudis have raised the price. They say there has to be a real pathway, irreversible steps and so forth. But if Gaza, if, if you know, the devastation, the killing, is out of the headlines. And interestingly, I just thought about this now, but you know, this may even be an incentive for Netanyahu to just prolong negotiations. He's very good at that, muddling through all the time, not making a decision to end the war, but not continuing the war, because if Gaza is off of the headlines, the pressure decreases for the Saudis, they have more ability to say, okay, yeah, we're gonna, we'll do a pathway because they want a bilateral deal with Israel. It's in their interest. Israelis and Saudis are not at war. A peace deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia is not hard. The Saudis want a defense agreement with the United States. Biden was negotiating. This. Mohammed bin Salman, de facto leader of Saudi Arabia, just pledged $600 million investment. Trump says he wants a trillion. They got to 600 million. It started. It's all in negotiation, right? Who knows what will really ever happen? It's talk, talk, talk. But this is they know how to work very well. Trump's first trip to the to anywhere in the world in his first administration was to Saudi Arabia.

Dov Waxman 40:25

Yes, our leader was to MBS.

Dalia Dassa Kaye 40:27

First call with a foreign leader was MBS, Mohammed bin Salman. So I think it's a very, it's not really going too far out there to think that there will be some kind of Israeli, US, Saudi, some kind of deal. But the question is, is it going to produce a viable and durable and just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? That is where I think the answer is likely no. It was likely no with Biden, which is why I actually argued he was focusing on the wrong area for his Middle East diplomacy. And it's going to be I think, very likely now, that this will not lead to a real enduring peace, which is in the US interest, because otherwise we keep going back to these cycles of violence that disrupt the US interest, because we get caught up in it. Look, we have contractors today, who knows what we'll have tomorrow. We have the potential for radicalism and terrorism that could reach our borders. We have a very strong interest in solving this conflict for all kinds of humanitarian but also strategic reasons. I don't think that's where we're headed, but I just want to warn everyone, you're going to hear a lot of talk about the big, mega deal. It's going to be very much, very much a priority of this administration, like it was the last one. I just think we should not be deluded that this is the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Kal Raustiala 41:54

Dalia just given that, would we be better off? I realize this is not going to happen, but would we be better off stepping back. In other words, if Trump decided, which, maybe he would decide I'm fed up with this or, I mean, this highly far fetched, but would we be better off being less involved? I mean, the history of American involvement is very intense, with honestly, very little to show for it.

Dalia Dassa Kaye 42:17

No, we wouldn't be because, you know, we don't want this war to resume. This war is devastating to all of our strategic interests and domestic. So no, we want to keep this, we want to keep the bloodshed on hold. We want this pause to continue. I think there are also things we can do, and this is why, again, it's not contradictory, when I say we have this great opportunity in the Arab world, but I also don't think that's a silver bullet to solve everything. But what we can do is these Arab countries that want peace are our closest security partners. We can be working with them in creating a different vision and trying to work with civil society with this is what a lot of people are talking about, create an alternative Palestinian governance structure that can be there and thinking through those day after issues. And lots of smart people are doing that, but actually putting our muscle behind it, having a sustained effort Trump himself will likely not have that attention. But, certainly there are those within the bureaucracy that are more than able to do this. Marshall the aid effort, the reconstruction effort, the refugee and migration issues, those are all things the United States could be very helpful with our international partners in Europe. Even the Chinese have an interest in this for goodness sake. So I think there's a lot we can do, and we don't have to do it ourselves. It's not like we're all in or we're all out.

Kal Raustiala 43:38

Yeah, great, great. Sorry, Dov, go ahead.

Dov Waxman 43:40

Yeah, no. I was just gonna say, I mean, you know, I wouldn't even, I don't even think it's worth talking about the possibility for Israeli-Palestinian peace. I think that is, you know, certainly, yes, it's an interest, it's a goal. But, you know, the more immediate concern is simply, can Gaza become livable? Can it? Can Gaza, is the Gaza Strip, you know, and the 2 million Palestinians who live there, are they going to be able to, you know, survive in Gaza? And so, you know, setting aside the border, question of, will there be peace, will there be any kind of stability in Gaza? What's going to happen in Gaza? Not even talking about the West Bank, because I think you know, the challenges there are huge. And Dalia, you already mentioned, the potential cost of reconstruction are enormous. None of that's going to even begin, as long as there isn't any sort of alternative governance, anybody to take over. So far, the Israeli government Prime Minister Netanyahu have refused to even present any sort of viable day after plan. We're now getting. We're not at the day after yet, but it's no longer you know, in the distant future. And I think the fact that the the Netanyahu is has basically said, you know, he doesn't want the Palestinian Authority involved. The Arab states have said the Palestinian Authority has to be involved. Everybody knows that that is really the only way of having any alternative to Hamas, I think. But because bringing the Palestinian Authority in could then increase the pressure for moves towards talks for a Palestinian statehood. So my main concern right now is just what's going to happen in Gaza, and is Gaza going to be a, you know, a place where the Hamas is going to are going to be in control, which would obviously be very bad for not just for Israel, but for Gazans, because Hamas has brought absolute catastrophe to Gazans. But also, obviously there won't be any reconstruction in Gaza. No Arab state, no matter how much they want to support the reconstruction of Gaza, they're not going to do that if the governance of Gaza is unclear. And I don't see, unfortunately, Israel, this Israeli government, I should say, kind of agreeing on a plan to govern Gaza, that would somehow be acceptable to Netanyahu, on the one hand, would be acceptable to the Palestinians on the other hand, because it has to have some kind of legitimacy, and the various, you know, regional states, like the Emiratis, the Saudis and others, think it's going to be very hard. And so my, you know, even if somehow the second stage is completed, we're talking about a place that has been absolutely devastated, and a population that has been, you know, those who have managed to survive, deeply traumatized, and so I think just that challenge alone is really formidable, if not insurmountable, let alone the broader issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace, which I think is obviously, you know, deep, very desirable. But I agree with Dalia, you know, there may be some sort of cosmetic things that that allow MBS to make his deal because he doesn't care, I don't think a lot about the Palestinians, and It will allow Trump to get the deal that he wants. And, you know, but it won't. Not only will it not solve the Israeli Palestinian conflict, I ultimately don't think it's probably going to do much for the very beleaguered and much suffering residents of Gaza.

Kal Raustiala 47:35

Yeah, yeah. You mentioned, you know, or you alluded to, a couple of options about what that governance might look like, or what that path so obviously this is all predicated on actually getting to phase three, or at least phase two, and then into phase three. So a lot of maybe wishful thinking to get there, but if we did Dov, what would you see as a couple of plausible ways that Gaza might be governed. What are realistic options here?

Dov Waxman 48:04

Well, I mean, it seems the most realistic, were it not for the fact that it's probably going to be vetoed by the Israeli government, would be a kind of technocratic committee that's basically backed by the Palestinian Authority, but it's officially independent. This is what the Egyptians want, have proposed, and Hamas have indicated that they would accept this. Hamas, I think, is quite would be quite happy to give up governance of Gaza, not to give up its arms, but to give up governance and so a kind of, you know, technocratic government that has the backing of the Palestinian Authority, and that could then bring in all of this money. I think that's the most realistic. I mean, the Israelis at one point talked about, you know, empowering clans, until some of those clan chiefs were assassinated by Hamas, that went out the window. You know, they talked about having the US and the Emiratis and others internationally, governmentless. That's not going to happen at the end of the day. It has to be Palestinian-Led. I mean, you know any any legitimate governance in Gaza has to be Palestinian-Led. And while the Palestinian Authority itself is not legitimate, ultimately, a reformed Palestinian Authority, and one that has elections could be. And so ultimately, that is the only path. But as I say, I think that as long as the right are in power in Israel, they're not going to agree to that. And certainly the far right, they want to bring down the Palestinian Authority, not empower it any further. So unfortunately, I think unless there's a political change in Israel, which is possible for other reasons, which we probably don't have time to get into, but unless there's a different government that's not dependent on, you know, as that is kind of a moderate, centrist government that's willing to work with the Palestinian Authority, I don't see, I don't see Gaza having a stable government.

Kal Raustiala 50:02

Would external actors have to play some role, in terms of whether, I don't know, maintaining peace. It's not going to be peacekeepers, but you know, some security role, something you know, is that a realistic option? Is that necessary?

Dov Waxman 50:17

Yeah, I think so. I think you know they would need. I mean, they're both because of the scale of the tasks that any any government in Gaza would have to undertake, they would need substantial support, both financial support from gold since but also on the ground and through the provision, potentially, of security forces. Is quite that's possible, but ultimately, I don't see Arab states like the Emiratis particularly, or the Jordanians contributing to that, if that government is somehow seen as, as you know, completely illegitimate and doesn't have any domestic legitimacy among Palestinians,

Kal Raustiala 50:55

yeah, Dalia,

Dalia Dassa Kaye 50:57

no, I think those are all good points. I think the focus now is on civilian. How would a Palestinian civilian will work? But absolutely, there'd have to be an international component to security, because this would assume the Israelis are fully withdrawn again and have not reoccupied Gaza. Big, big question marks. And you know, there's precedent for that in southern Lebanon, with UNIFIL, with the UN forces that were there. Now we have a cease fire going on in Lebanon that's relying on the Lebanese Armed Forces so but which, by the way, is up next week, and there's questions about whether or not to know who's slow walking that Cease fire. So not to throw another wrench in this, hopefully this, this Gaza cease fire deal moving forward, but if things blow up in Lebanon, that's not going to necessarily have a good positive effect on on implementation of Gaza Cease fire. But I think at some point you're going to need that. But ultimately, we keep going back to Israel, because Israel is the stronger power. It is in control of the territory. It's control of the military operations, not tinyahu. You need a government that is interested and motivated and willing to give Palestinians an independent whether you call it a state whether, I mean, you know, most Israelis now, not even on the right. Polling shows majority of Israelis oppose a two state solution now, and what's happening on the ground is very much undermining a two state solution. But you need political will in Israel, and until the political dynamics change in Israel, it's it's going to be very difficult to get a durable resolution. I agree with them, not just Israeli Palestinian issues, but even just for Gaza to work. And so I agree that that we should do what we can do. So now the focus is humanitarian relief. Keep the pause in fighting, get the hostages out, make sure the prisoner releases are facilitated. And, you know, just try to improve people's lives to the extent you can. But I mean, when you have 1 million people in Gaza who have no home to return to. I mean, you know, we're here in Los Angeles with the fires. One cannot compare a war to to a natural disaster. But you know, even on a micro scale, you can see that what displacement does when you have this many people out. Imagine 1 million people already suffering from very difficult humanitarian conditions. This is a daunting task, so it is going to require international support, United States and others, because this can't be done alone.

Kal Raustiala 53:30

Yeah, yeah. Well, we're at the end of the hour, so I really want to thank both of you. Those were excellent comments, responses, analyzes, really well done. So. Dov and Dahlia. Thank you very much. I want to thank our co sponsors as well. This is the kind of thing that, you know, we throw together when we feel we need to, and I think in this case, we really need to. I'm glad we did it, and I imagine we may be revisiting this again in the coming months. So thanks again for coming on. Thank you all for joining us. Have a GREAT.

Transcribed by https://otter.ai